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Abstract
Previous studies analyzing the impact of payoffs’ cardinality in
cooperation dilemmas have concluded that the additional benefits of
defecting against a cooperator, the greed dimension of the game, are
more salient than the additional costs of cooperating against a defec-
tor, the fear dimension of the game. We conduct an experiment to
show that when the costs of cooperation exceed its gains, this pat-
tern is reversed. The larger effect of fear with respect to greed on the
likelihood to defect is robust to random rematching and to repeated
matching, and is mostly driven by a relative rather than an absolute
perception of the incentives to cooperate across different dilemmas.
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1 Introduction
Social dilemmas describe situations characterized by a tradeoff between indi-
vidual and collective incentives. If someone is willing to incur in an individual
cost to provide a benefit to the group he belongs to we say he is willing to
cooperate. This situation is a “dilemma” if individuals are better off when
the other group members cooperate, but for each one of them is individually
rational to not incur in the costs of cooperation.
The two “motivational pressures” to defect, i.e. to not cooperate, were
proposed by Rapoport (1967) in its definition of the Cooperation Index for the
most popular of the cooperation dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (hence-
forth PD)1. These incentives to defect are not simultaneously activated, but
rather they depend on the expected action of the opponent. Fear is associ-
ated to the extra costs from cooperation if opponent’s defection is expected.
Greed, on the other hand, is associated to the extra benefits from defection
if opponent’s cooperation is expected.
The notions of fear and greed were extended to n-players cooperation
dilemmas by Schelling (1973) in his study of binary choices. Although he did
not make the reference to these labels, Schelling drew the attention to the
separate analysis of individual incentives to stay out of a coalition when the
majority already joined it, i.e. the benefits of defection under the majority’s
cooperation, and the lack of incentives to join a coalition when almost nobody
have joined it, i.e. the costs of cooperation under the majority’s defection.
The acknowledgement of these two separate forces was followed by em-
pirical testings of their differences. Komorita et al. (1980) conducted a three-
player PD, finding that greed has a larger negative impact on the cooperation
rate than fear. More recently, Ahn et al. (2001) proposed a set of four PD
games to analyze the incentives to defect in a between-subjects protocol in-
volving fixed (or Partners) matching and random (or Strangers) matching.
They found that fear and greed affect negatively the cooperation rates with
1For a meta-analysis of experimental evidence for Prisoner’s Dilemmas see Sally (1995).
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Strangers matching but not with Partners matching, suggesting that history
of play is more important than the motivational pressures to defect. When
these dimensions have an effect, as in the case of Strangers matching, greed
was more relevant than fear in the reduction of cooperation.
The manipulation of the fear and greed dimensions has been also helpful
to analyze gender differences in the likelihood to cooperate (Simpson, 2003;
Kuwabara, 2005) and to test the neurobiological foundations of in-group and
out-group perceptions towards cooperation (De Dreu et al., 2010, 2012).
Empirical evidence suggests that the greed dimension is more salient than
the fear dimension in the individual decisions to engage in cooperative be-
havior. It implies, in terms of contributions to public goods, that individuals
are more aware of the increasing benefits of not contributing, conditional on
group members’ cooperation, than to the increasing costs of contributing,
conditional on group members’ defection. Nevertheless, the relative effects
of fear and greed were previously tested in situations in which the gains from
cooperation were at least as large as the gains from defection.
Our conjecture is that fear was less likely to induce defection in Komorita
et al. (1980) and Ahn et al. (2001) because the gains from cooperation were
more “attractive” than the costs of engaging in this behavior. If cooperation
is not very costly, the likelihood to assume mutual cooperation as default
outcome increases. These conditions suppress the fear of being exploited by
a defector, while at the same time they make more salient the effects of greed
in the cooperation decision.
We propose an alternative experimental setting in which the costs of
cooperation, fear and greed, exceed the cooperator’s gain. We hypothesize
that the dominant effect greed over fear will be reversed if there is more
uncertainty regarding the expected play of the opponent.
Blonski et al. (2011) state that cooperation gets more risky in a PD if
the “suckers’s payoff”, the payoff received by a cooperator when he faces a
defector, gets smaller. This is equivalent to say that cooperation becomes
a riskier strategy when the fear dimension increases. They show that, for
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experimental data with an infinitely repeated PD, a discount factor depend-
ing on the value of the “sucker’s payoff” provides a better prediction of the
cooperation rates.
In our experimental design we manipulate the fear dimension by reducing
the sucker’s payoff, as in Blonski et al. (2011); but also the greed dimension
by increasing the payoff received by a defector when faces a cooperator, the
parameter known as the “temptation” payoff. We increase these dimensions
long enough to alter the outcomes maximizing and minimizing the joint pay-
offs, leaving the PD conditions. A sufficiently large increase in the greed
dimension leads to a point in which the aggregate benefits from the asym-
metric outcome exceed those under mutual cooperation, even if the addi-
tional earnings are captured by the defector. Correspondingly, an increase
in the fear dimension may enlarge the costs inflicted to the cooperator in
the asymmetric outcome up to a point that mutual defection will be socially
most preferred than the asymmetric outcome.
We find that, when the benefits from defection are larger than the benefits
from cooperation, fear has a larger impact than greed in the likelihood to
cooperate. The effect is observed not only in the Strangers treatment, but
also in the Partners treatment. For the latter matching type, the effects are
identifiable after disentangling the complementarities between the history of
the game and the incentives to defect, in particular the fear dimension. We
also show evidence that the effects of fear and greed are driven by a relative
rather than an absolute perception of the incentives to cooperate across the
different dilemmas. This is particularly clear within the partners condition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 are
defined the conditions for the three cooperation dilemmas used in the ex-
perimental setting, which is fully described in Section 3. The results are
presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Defining fear and greed
in cooperation dilemmas
A cooperation dilemma is characterized by a unique Pareto inefficient Nash
equilibrium. Defection strictly dominates Cooperation, leading self-regarding
players to an undesirable outcome. Following Rapoport (1967), we define
the four payoffs of this game as the temptation (T ) to defect when the other
player cooperates, the reward (R) earned when both players cooperate, the
punishment (P ) received when both players defect; and the “sucker’s payoff”
(S), received by cooperating against a defector. The game is presented in its
strategic form in Table 1.
Table 1: Strategic form of a cooperation dilemma
PPPPPPPSelf
Opp.
(C)ooperate (D)efect
(C)ooperate R,R S, T
(D)efect T, S P, P
The condition (1) is shared by all cooperation dilemmas and is known as
the suboptimality condition. It is because T > R and P > S that cooperation
is strictly dominated in this game. In the particular case of the PD, it exists a
second constraint defined as the externality larger than internality condition
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1996). As shown in expression (2), it guarantees
that the externality cost imposed on the other player (R− S) will be larger
than internality derived from the benefits of defecting against the cooperator
(T −R).
T > R > P > S (1)
2R > T + S (2)
Now we can attach our definitions of fear and greed to the payoff param-
eters in cooperation dilemmas. Going back to Table 1, the greed dimension
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will be the difference between row payoffs in the first column T − R, i.e.,
when opponent’s cooperation is expected. Similarly, the fear dimension is
given by the difference between row payoffs in the second column P −S, i.e.,
when opponent’s defection is expected. The remaining difference between
two consecutive payoffs according to condition (1), R − P , is known as the
cooperator’s gain. It reflects the additional benefits received by each player
when they move from mutual defection to mutual cooperation.
Holding the cooperator’s gain constant, the only way to enlarge the greed
dimension is by increasing the temptation payoff. If T−R is increased enough
the externality larger than internality condition is no longer held. The sum
of payoffs will be maximized under the asymmetric outcome and mutual
cooperation will turn into a second best from an utilitarian perspective. If
the internality would exceed the externality, the defector could compensate
the coooperator with an ex-post transfer δ under the threat that S + δ > P ,
and then he could keep for himself the excedent from mutual cooperation T−
(R+ δ). In a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon the players may
establish an alternating strategy, allowing them to maximize mutual payoffs
while they minimize the difference between their intertemporal earnings.
Another externality larger than internality condition, often neglected in
the definition of a PD, is displayed in expression (3). It guarantees that the
costs of leaving mutual defection P−S are smaller than the opponent’s bene-
fits of keep choosing defection T−P . If the condition holds, mutual defection
minimizes the players’ aggregate payoffs. We could think of condition (3) as
a reflection of condition (2) in the domain of losses within the asymmetric
outcomes. Both are guaranteeing that the PD outcomes lie in a convex hull.
But unlike (2), in which the loss of convexity leads to a set of alternating
strategies mutually beneficial, if (3) is violated the set of feasible payoffs
under mixed strategies lead to worst expected payoffs than mutual defec-
tion. Holding the cooperator’s gain constant, the violation of condition (3)
occurs by a substantial reduction in the “sucker’s payoff”, or equivalently, an
increase in the fear dimension.
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T + S > 2P (3)
If conditions (2) or (3) are not satisfied we no longer consider the game a
PD. Nevertheless, as long as the suboptimality condition holds these games
are still considered cooperation dilemmas. We will define as a Greedy Dilemma
(GD) a game in which expression (2) is no longer valid, which may appear due
to an outbounded greed level. Likewise, we will define as a Fearful Dilemma
(FD) a game that violates condition (3).
3 Experimental Design
The effects of fear and greed were tested on a within-subjects basis using
three different cooperation dilemmas: a Fearful Dilemma (FD), a Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) and a Greedy Dilemma (GD). Participants interacted for
thirty rounds, divided into three stages of ten rounds, one for each coop-
eration dilemma. The matching protocols, Strangers and Partners, were
introduced on a between-subjects basis, as well as the order in which the
three cooperation dilemmas were presented to players. The full description
of the six treatment cells is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Experimental design: Treatment cells
Cell Matching Games’ sequence
1 Strangers FD - PD - GD
2 Partners FD - PD - GD
3 Strangers PD - GD - FD
4 Partners PD - GD - FD
5 Strangers GD - FD - PD
6 Partners GD - FD - PD
The payoff matrices for the three dilemmas are displayed in Table 3. Each
unit earned in these games was paid at $100 Colombian pesos (cop)2. We
take the PD as the baseline in our experiment. In this game, the fear and
2At October 2011 the exchange rate for $1 usd was $1,903 cop. This means that each
point in Table 3 was paid at 5.25 dollar cents.
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greed dimensions have a value of 1 unit. The cooperator’s gain, which will
be held constant across games, has a value of 2 units.
To convert the PD into the FD we reduce the “sucker’s payoff” from 5
to 1 units as is shown in Table 3. This is equivalent to an increase of four
times the fear dimension. Following a similar procedure, the GD game is
obtained from the standard PD by increasing the temptation payoff from 9
to 13 units, also an increase of four times the greed dimension.
Table 3: Payoff matrices for the three cooperation dilemmas
Fearful Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Greedy Dilemma
C D C D C D
C 8; 8 1; 9 C 8; 8 5; 9 C 8; 8 5; 13
D 9; 1 6; 6 D 9; 5 6; 6 D 13; 5 6; 6
We define the cooperator’s cost as the maximum level between the fear
and greed dimensions. If we compute the ratio between the cooperator’s cost
and the cooperator’s gain for each one of the three dilemmas, we have a value
of 0.50 in the PD, and a value of 2.50 in the FD and GD games. In Ahn
et al. (2001), the ratio is 0.25 in the baseline PD game and increases to 1.00
in the other PD games used to test the effects of fear and greed.
The ratio between costs and benefits increases four times in Ahn et al.’s
design and five times in ours, which are comparable magnitudes. However,
it is only in our design in which the absolute value of this ratio surpasses the
unity. This is a key feature of our design, since we claim that the reversal
in the relative weights of fear and greed in the cooperation decision only
occurs when the cooperator’s cost exceed the cooperator’s gain and there-
fore the default outcome is more likely to be mutual defection than mutual
cooperation.
The experiment was conducted at Universidad de los Andes, in Bogota´
(Colombia), between September and October 2011. The 156 participants
were selected from a total of 349 applicants who were initially contacted by
email or flyers delivered in the university. The participants were undergrad-
uate and graduate students from different majors, mainly economics and
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engineering. Descriptive statistics of the participants are shown in Table 4.
A total of thirteen sessions, with twelve players each, were conducted.
There were two sessions per treatment cell, except for cell number 5, for
which we conducted three sessions. They lasted from sixty to eighty minutes.
There was no show-up fee and the participants were initially informed that
they will receive the payoffs’ sum of their decisions from all the thirty rounds
of play at the end of the game. Participants earned on average 20,500 cop,
corresponding to 10.7 usd3 at the time of the experiment.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics from participants
Mean Standard deviation
Male 0.576 0.495
Age 20.603 2.747
Academic terms 6.013 3.088
Economics 0.359 0.481
Engineering 0.250 0.434
Art / Design 0.179 0.384
Social Sciences 0.128 0.335
Business 0.122 0.328
Natural Sciences 0.122 0.328
Earnings (cop) 20,506 2,227
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Once
participants fully understood the instructions and signed the informed con-
sentment, they started with a practice round (a 2 × 2 coordination game)
to get familiarized with the decision screen. After the practice round, par-
ticipants interacted for thirty rounds divided into three sets of ten rounds
each. Each one of the games shown in Table 3 was played in one of the sets.
Once rounds 10 and 20 were finished, the experimenter publicly announced
that the game they were facing was about to change in the following round,
and that it will remain the same for ten rounds. After the thirty rounds par-
ticipants completed a post-experimental survey and receive their earnings.
Instructions for one of the sessions are presented in Appendix A.
3Daily minimum wage in Colombia for 2011 was approximately 9.3 usd.
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4 Results
4.1 The asymmetric effects of fear and greed
The cooperation rates for the three dilemmas are shown in Figure 1 for
both matching protocols. For the Strangers matching we observe that the
cooperation rate is higher in the PD (0.198), followed by the GD (0.146)
and the FD (0.071). The differences in the cooperation rate between these
games, as well as the p-values of the statistical tests, are shown at the bottom
of the figure4. An adjusted Chi-squared test is used to compare cooperation
rates across games. Observations are clusterized at the subject level for its
computation. Under Strangers matching the PD and the GD are statistically
different from the FD, but the difference between these two games is not
statistically significant. For Partners matching, the cooperation rate in the
PD (0.708) is higher than in the FD (0.568) and the GD (0.554). Although
the differences with respect to the PD are statistically significant, cooperation
rates between the FD and the GD are not statistically different.
Results from the Partners matching suggest that, in presence of reputa-
tional mechanisms, the fear and greed dimensions have a similar effect on
the decision to cooperate. Nevertheless, data aggregation at the game ×
matching level in Figure 1 makes challenging the detection of between-
subjects differences across dilemmas. Figure 2 provides an alternative repre-
sentation of the results, displaying the cumulative frequency of the fraction
of cooperative moves per participant. The more frequent the cooperative be-
havior, the steeper the cumulative frequency when the fraction of cooperative
moves is close to unity. Following this description, one might interpret the
area above the curve as a proxy for the cooperation rate in each dilemma.
For the Strangers matching the differences between the three dilemmas
are consistent with the results in Figure 1. The largest percentage of sub-
jects that never cooperated belongs to the FD (64.3%), followed by the GD
4In the first row we present the differences for the GD and the FD with respect to the
PD. In the second row we presente the difference for the FD with respect to the GD.
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Figure 1: Cooperation rate by game and matching protocol
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(52.4%) and the PD (39.3%). The subjects that cooperated more frequently
in the FD did it for four rounds, while for the GD and the PD we found
that at least one player cooperated for the whole ten rounds. The three
curves do not cross each other5, remarking a similar behavioral pattern in all
three dilemmas. They differ only in the fraction of participants that never
cooperated and the speed of convergence to full defection.
Under Partners matching, although the average cooperation rate does
not differ statistically from one setting to another, we observe very different
cumulative distributions for the FD and the GD games. The percentage of
subjects that did not cooperate in any round in the GD (8.3%) is almost as
lower as in the PD (6.9%). In the FD a larger proportion of subjects, about
one of every four (26.4%), did not cooperate in any round. On the other
hand, the largest proportion of subjects that cooperated in all ten rounds
appear in the FD (38.9%), followed by the PD (31.9%) and the GD (27.8%).
In the FD is highly dependent on the trajectory. We find for this game the
5The only exception occurs between the GD and the PD for 8 rounds of cooperation.
However, this effect is driven by the single player that cooperated for more than five rounds
in the GD dilemma.
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Figure 2: Cumulative frequency of cooperative moves (per player) by game and
matching protocol
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largest fraction of subjects that never cooperated but also the largest fraction
of subjects that always cooperated. The differences between fear and greed
also exist under the Partners matching protocol, but they strongly depend
on the history of the game. A past cooperative choice is more rewarded in
the FD than in the GD because, by definition, the pressure from the fear
dimension is overcame once mutual cooperation is reached.
We run a set of logistic regressions to test if the differences between fear
and greed are (i) directly observable in the Strangers treatment; and (ii)
observable in the Partners treatment after controlling for the game history
in each dilemma separately. To disentangle the complementarities between
reciprocity and the motivational pressures to defect we introduce an inter-
action term between the opponent’s lagged choice and the fear and greed
dimensions.
The marginal effects for the probability of cooperation are reported in
Table 5. Models (1) and (2) correspond to Strangers and models (3) and (4)
to Partners matching. Columns (1) and (3) do not include the interaction
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terms mentioned above, while columns (2) and (4) do. All four models include
individual and round fixed effects, as well as other individual characteristics
such as gender, age, career and academic terms in the university. The χ2
statistics resultant from the comparison between the coefficients from fear
and greed for each regression, as well as their correspondent p-value, are
shown at the bottom of the table.
Columns (1) and (3) replicate the results we initially observed in Fig-
ure 1. For Strangers, facing the FD reduces the probability of cooperation
in 18.7 percentage points (pp) with respect to the PD ; while facing the GD
reduces the probability of cooperation in 6.9 pp with respect to the PD. The
difference between these coefficients is statistically significant. For Partners,
the reduction in the probability of cooperation of 9.7 pp when facing the FD
is not statistically different from the reduction of 10.1 pp in the probability
of cooperation in the GD (p-value 0.856), both compared to the PD.
Table 5: Logit estimates: Probability of cooperation (marginal effects)
Probability of cooperation Strangers Partners
(marginal effects) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fear (FD) -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.097*** -0.175***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.036)
Greed (GD) -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.101*** -0.069**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031)
Round -0.0079*** -0.0079*** 0.0016 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Opponent’s choicet−1 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.298*** 0.276***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.013) (0.031)
Opponent’s choicet−1 × Fear 0.006 0.141***
(0.054) (0.049)
Opponent’s choicet−1 × Greed 0.011 -0.057
(0.041) (0.043)
Fear = Greed (χ2 statistic) 25.92*** 20.73*** 0.03 10.56***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.856) (0.001)
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,701 1,701
Individual fixed effects included in all regressions. Controls included: gender, age, terms in university,
and career dummies for economics and business. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
With the interaction terms included in model (4), the differences between
fear and greed under Partners matching become evident. The reduction in
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the probability of cooperation in the FD, with respect to the PD, is of 17.5
pp. This effect is, in magnitude, larger than the reduction of 6.9 pp in the
GD. Unlike model (3), for model (4) the difference between the marginal
effects of fear and greed is statistically significant, even at the one percent
level (p-value 0.001).
Note that in model (4) the only interaction term that is statistically
significant is Opponent’s choicet−1 × Fear. Its effect can be interpreted as
an additional increase of 14.1 pp in the probability of cooperation in the FD
(for a total of 41.7 pp with respect to the 27.6 pp in the PD) if the opponent
cooperated in the previous interaction. The term Opponent’s choicet−1 ×
Greed, which implies a reduction of 5.7 pp in the likelihood to cooperate in
a GD if the opponent cooperated in the previous round, is not statistically
significant.
4.2 The relative effects of fear and greed
Within-subjects variation in the reward structures of a game usually holds
on the sequential independence assumption (Vlaev and Chater, 2006). It
means that choices in a game are assumed to be based only on the attributes
of the current game, and that they are independent from the attributes of
previous games. In terms of our experimental design, the validity of the
sequential independence assumption would require that the differences in co-
operation rates between dilemmas would be orthogonal to the order in which
these games were faced. Following this argument, the differences between
stages for a given game should be explained uniquely by the gradual decay
of cooperation for Strangers matching, and its gradual increase for Partners
matching.
The cooperation rates aggregated at the game×stage×matching level are
reported in Figure 3. For each matching protocol, the average cooperation
rate is shown separately for the cases when the dilemma was played in the
first stage, from Round 1 to 10; and when it was played in the third and last
stage, from Round 21 to 30. Differences in cooperation rates are reported,
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for each stage, at the bottom of the figure. We also report the p-value of the
adjusted Chi squared test with data clusterized at the individual level.
Figure 3: Cooperation rates for each dilemma in the first stage (rounds 1 to 10)
and the last stage (rounds 21 to 30)
.246
.225
.142 .142
.042
.029
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
PD Greed
0.021
(0.761)
Fear
0.104*
(0.061)
0.083
(0.196)
PD Greed
0.100*
(0.070)
Fear
0.113**
(0.037)
0.013
(0.624)
Rounds 1−10 Rounds 21−30
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
ra
te
Strangers
.517
.496
.554
.762
.575
.646
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
PD Greed
0.021
(0.843)
Fear
−0.037
(0.734)
0.058
(0.622)
PD Greed
0.187*
(0.061)
Fear
0.116
(0.288)
−0.071
(0.524)
Rounds 1−10 Rounds 21−30
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
ra
te
Partners
The only difference that is statistically significant in the the first stage for
Strangers matching is the comparison between the PD and the FD. For the
last stage, if the sequential independence assumption is held, this should be
the only difference between games remaining statistically significant. Never-
theless, what we observe is that when the most unequal games are compared
to the PD, both differences turn out to be statistically different from zero.
With respect to the FD, not only the magnitude increases but also its signif-
icance level.
For Partners matching the between-stages comparison is more striking.
In the first stage, the differences between cooperation rates for the PD, the
GD and the FD are not statistically significant. Therefore, the differences
between games reported in Figure 2 cannot be reconciled with the sequential
independence assumption. The higher and statistically significant coopera-
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tion rate in the PD obtained with aggregate data must therefore come from
advanced stages in the experiment. For the last stage, Rounds 21 to 30, we
find that the difference between the PD and the GD is statistically signifi-
cant, but not the difference between the PD and the FD. Our explanation for
the lack of significance despite having larger differences than in the Strangers
treatment is that the high inter-cluster correlations reduce notably the power
in our sample.
5 General discussion
5.1 Why fear is more salient than greed?
When payoff inequality within the asymmetric outcomes of a cooperation
dilemma is large enough, the fear dimension has a larger impact in the likeli-
hood to cooperate than the greed dimension. At first sight this result seems
to contradict the previous findings from Komorita et al. (1980) and Ahn et al.
(2001), but we argue that the relative effects of fear and greed depend on
the cost-benefit analysis of cooperation versus defection.
We claim that an increase in the fear and greed dimensions alter the
expectations regarding the other’s decision. Engel and Zhurakhovska (2012)
show that subjects beliefs’ on their counterpart’s likelihood to cooperate is
positively correlated with an increase in the gains from cooperation relative
to its costs. If this is the case, the operating “motivational pressure” is greed
and fear is left with a secondary role in the decision. Assuming we can extend
this argument in the opposite direction, i.e. that the counterpart’s expected
likelihood to cooperate is reduced by an increase in the cost of cooperation,
we can rationalize why the salience of the fear dimension increases for the
FD and GD games. The larger the increase in the fear or greed dimension,
the higher the probability that subjects take mutual defection as the “default
outcome” of the game.
An alternative explanation could be loss aversion, which means that un-
der uncertainty expected losses are more weighted than expected earnings
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Under this hypothesis, fear would be more
salient because the reduction in utility of being exploited in the FD is larger
than the increase in utility of exploiting a cooperator in the GD, even if the
payoff differences are the same. Nevertheless, loss aversion cannot explain
why the relative weights of fear and greed are the opposite when the costs of
cooperation are at most equal to its benefits, as in Ahn et al. (2001).
Our claim that fear becomes more salient than greed when the costs
of cooperation are high enough to switch the “default outcome” is more
evident in the absence of additional mechanisms that may alter the costs of
cooperation. This is the case of the Strangers environment, characterized
by random interactions, in which the differential effects of the “motivational
pressures” were directly observed. On the contrary, in the Partners matching
protocol, in which the costs of cooperation are reduced by the presence of
reputation and retaliation mechanisms, the effects of fear and greed seemed
symmetric at first sight.
We unveil the asymmetric effects of fear and greed by considering the
game history as complementary rather than substitute of the pressures to
defect. We disentangle the asymmetries between these two effects by in-
troducing interaction terms between the opponent’s lagged choice and the
FD and GD categorical variables. Of these interactions, only the opponent’s
choicet−1× fear ’s coefficient was statistically significant. Its positive effect
indicates that an opponent’s cooperative move is more rewarded under the
FD than in the PD, suggesting that the pressure from the fear dimension
ceases when counterpart’s cooperation is expected. In addition, if coopera-
tive moves are highly rewarded in the FD due to reputational effects, then we
should not find these differences for Strangers matching. Indeed, results in
Table 5 reveal that none of the interaction terms are statistically significant
in model (2).
The natural inquiry after these arguments is to analyze to which extent
the mechanisms under Strangers and Partners are consistent with each other.
Our answer is that even if for both matching protocols the explanation could
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be reduced to “how the default outcome switches as a function of the relative
cost of cooperation”, the updating process of the counterpart’s expected
behavior is very different. For Strangers, the updating relies on what a
subject can infer from his last opponent with respect to the behavior of the
entire population, which is not too much. For Partners, this inference is
much more stronger because the subject is updating his opponent’s expected
behavior based on the actual history of their pairwise interactions. This is
the reason why we observe path dependency for Partners matching. A signal
of cooperative behavior is strong enough to induce cooperation with a fixed
partner, but it does not provide enough information for a subject randomly
rematched after each interaction.
Going back to the differences between fear and greed under fixed match-
ing, one might think on an alternative explanation for the intermediate co-
operation rate in the GD. Given that T + S > 2R, the intertemporal payoff
maximization will be achieved by a coordinate alternation between coopera-
tion and defection reflected in a cooperation rate close to one half. If subjects
were pursuing this strategy, the effect of greed on the likelihood to cooperate
will not be driven by the relative perceptions of the costs of cooperation but
rather by a notable degree of rationality and a capacity to establish tacit
coordination agreements.
Nevertheless, we do not find evidence supporting the coordinate alterna-
tion strategy. To inspect the experimental data, we define it as an attempt
to alternate when a subject switched from cooperation to defection or vicev-
ersa during at least four consecutive rounds. For the Partners treatment,
16.6% attempted to alternate in the GD. However, using the same definition
of alternation, 9.7% of subjects also tried to alternate under the PD. After
performing a Wilcoxon rank-sum test6 we find that the difference between
games is not statistically significant. Therefore, we do not find evidence in
favor of the alternation hypothesis given that this strategy does not maximize
the expected joint payoffs in the PD.
6We compare the distributions of the number of attempts to alternate between games.
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5.2 When do we observe the effects of fear and greed?
Our findings suggest that the effects of fear and greed are mainly driven
by a relative rather than an absolute perception of the asymmetric payoffs.
Consider the results of the first stage of the game. At that point, each
participant has faced only one of the three cooperation dilemmas for ten
rounds. The differences in cooperation rates across treatment cells is what a
between-subjects design would have shown us. For Strangers, we would have
only find an effect of the fear dimension. For Partners, we would not have
found any effect of the motivational pressures in the likelihood to cooperate.
Therefore, it is necessary to explore how the effects depend on the transitions
from one payoff matrix to another.
We can think on the differences in cooperation rates across games and
between the first and the third stage as a differences-in-differences estimator
at the population level. Controlling for the gradual decrease of cooperation
for Strangers and its gradual increase for Partners, any remaining difference
across cooperation dilemmas must be explained by the relative effects of fear
and greed dimensions. In other words, the absence of order effects should be
validated by identical drops in cooperation from the first to the last stage
across the three games.
For Strangers matching, the slopes describing these drops are -0.183 for
the GD, -0.113 for the FD and -0.104 for the PD ; and they correspond to
reductions of 81.4%, 79.6% and 42.3% in the cooperation rate with respect
to the first stage, respectively. However, the drops in the GD and FD might
be bounded given the low cooperation rates for these games since the first
stage of the experiment. Therefore, we might have a lower-bound estimates
for these slopes. For Partners matching case we have at our disposition a
cleaner test for the order effects. Cooperation rates do not differ statistically
across games for the first stage, so differences would be then attributed to
changes in the perception of the relative costs and benefits of cooperation.
The slopes for the GD, the FD and the PD are +0.079, +0.092 and +0.245
respectively, corresponding to increases of 15.9%, 16.6% and 47.4% in the
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cooperation rates with respect to the first stage.
Although the increase of the cooperation rate between-stages is about
three times larger in the PD than in the GD and FD games, we acknowl-
edge that our tests fell short in terms of statistical significance. We argue
that, after correcting for the non-independence of observations by clustering
them at the individual level, the power in our test was dramatically reduced
because of the high inter-clustering correlations. In fact, a na¨ıve Wilcoxon
rank-sum test considering all observations as independent would say that the
comparisons of the GD and the FD with respect to the PD were statistically
significant at the one percent level.
Summing up, our interpretation of the order effects is the following: sub-
jects that played the PD after facing more unequal games were more likely
to cooperate than those that started playing the PD, and it is because they
did not have as reference point a more unequal dilemma. For Strangers, the
evidence is the lowest drop of the cooperation rate in the PD, about only
half of the drop in the GD and the FD. For Partners the evidence goes in the
opposite direction: the cooperation rate in the PD increases between two-
and-a-half and three times more than in the GD and the FD. Nevertheless,
our loss of statistical power due to the inter-clustering correlations limit our
results to suggestive evidence.
6 Concluding remarks
We explored experimentally what Rapoport (1967) defined as the two “mo-
tivational pressures” inducing defection in cooperation dilemmas. Unlike
previous studies (Komorita et al., 1980; Ahn et al., 2001), we found that
the fear of being exploited reduces more the likelihood to cooperate than the
additional benefits of exploiting the counterpart. This reversal in the relative
effects of fear and greed is the consequence of larger payoff differences within
the asymmetric outcomes in 2 × 2 cooperation dilemmas.
We conducted a laboratory experiment where subjects faced three differ-
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ent cooperation dilemmas for blocks of ten rounds each. When subjects were
randomly rematched after each round, the larger effect of the fear dimension
was immediately evident. When subjects interacted with the same partici-
pant repeatedly, the additional effect of fear needed to be disentangled from
the history of the game. As the opponent’s past cooperative decisions were
largely rewarded in the game with a large degree of fear, the complementar-
ity between reputational effects and the fear dimension suggests that path
dependency becomes particularly relevant if the costs of being exploited, but
not the benefits for the exploiter, are high.
The effects of fear and greed are reference dependent, as they only ap-
pear after a between-game comparison of the relative incentives to cooperate.
Further research should be undertaken to validate this result in a broader set
of social dilemmas such as public goods and common-pool resource games. A
reduction in the perception of the costs of cooperation, even if it remains as a
dominated strategy, could be a cost-effective strategy to increase cooperative
behavior.
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Appendix
A Experimental Instructions
(translated from Spanish)
The following figures correspond to screenshots of the experimental environ-
ment using the z-Tree software. Figure A.1 displays the initial interface where
the main instructions of the game can be read while the experimenter read
them out loud. Figure A.2 shows the instructions to take the decision in the
practice round. Figure A.3 displays the interface in which participants take
their decisions for each one of the thirty rounds of play. Figure A.4 presents
the feedback after each interaction: the subjects’ own and their opponent’s
actions and earnings.
Figure A.1: Experimental instructions
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Figure A.2: Experimental instructions for the practice round
Figure A.3: Decision environment for a given round
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Figure A.4: Feedback after each round
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